Resistance and the "Post-Recognition" Turn in Organizations by Fleming, P.
Fleming, P. (2016). Resistance and the "Post-Recognition" Turn in Organizations. Journal of 
Management Inquiry, 25(1), pp. 106-110. doi: 10.1177/1056492615600363 
City Research Online
Original citation: Fleming, P. (2016). Resistance and the "Post-Recognition" Turn in 
Organizations. Journal of Management Inquiry, 25(1), pp. 106-110. doi: 
10.1177/1056492615600363 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/15426/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
1 
 
Resistance and the ‘Post-Recognition’ Turn in Organizations 
Peter Fleming, Cass Business School, City University London 
I want to draw on the contributions of Courpasson (this issue) and Hardy (this issue) to reflect 
on the nature of resistance in contemporary organizations and extend the discussion by 
focusing on why and how actors might resist today. In particular, I propose that some types of 
resistance are motivated by what I label post-recognition politics rather than traditional 
struggles to be recognized, heard and listened to. Hence the prominent theme of exit, escape 
and social independence in emancipatory discourses in and around the workplace.  
But what does escape mean in this context and is it possible? To explore this question I want 
to argue that post-recognition struggles might entail ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ manifestations. The 
former seeks complete social independence from the neoliberal workplace in the name of 
self-determination. Whereas the weak version still participates on the stage of power but 
resists by deploying anonymity and camouflage to turn the tables on the powerful. The 
example of US Federal Reserve Bank employee Carmen Segarra is presented to explore this 
kind of resistance in action.  
Why Resist? 
When people resist they have usually come to a simple realization: I/we cannot go on like this 
and must therefore act. This realization is important to note because those who resist often 
feel they have little choice. They simply must, which renders it not so much ‘tactical’ in the 
Foucauldian sense (since there is little freewheeling opportunism involved) nor determinist as 
in the Marxist perspective (since there is a still choice not to resist) but more existentially 
speculative. Resistance refuses a present that is considered impossible. This makes it 
dangerous (for those in power) and a sensitive topic for scholars, especially in social science 
disciplines that aim to remain value neutral as much mainstream management research does.   
Resistance in contemporary organizations is generally driven by three motives. Actors resist 
practices that might economically undermine their interests (e.g., a pay-cut, redundancy, etc.). 
Individuals/groups may resist practices that are socially threatening, which is often linked to 
collective identity (e.g., if I am a member of a workers union who calls a strike over a 
particular issue, I maintain a united front even if not directly affected economically by the 
issue). And resistance might occur if a practice or circumstance is deemed ethically 
unacceptable (e.g., a whistle-blower who reveals dubious corporate behaviour). In many 
cases, including gender and race discrimination, people will resist for a combination of these 
reasons. Economic inequality may interlink with questions of social identity and ethical 
issues (i.e., hurt, indignity to others or oneself, etc.) may crosshatch with the other two 
motivators.  
When an individual or group realizes that things cannot continue as they are, a ‘stake’ is 
introduced into the mix, which renders the situation political proper. In other words, 
resistance prompts action because there is something to lose: for example, 
wages/employment, political solidarity and identity and/or ethical authenticity. Both 
Courpasson and Hardy’s insightful pieces demonstrate this well since the stakes are high in 
both descriptions of resistance: a livelihood and free speech (blogging) in the case of a 




However, both cases also reveal another element of the loss that orientates resistance as 
political action. People may resist because of the actual or potential losses that could befall 
them as described above. But resistors often also register the prospective costs of resisting in 
the first place, especially if the resistance fails. The hunger strikers in Courpasson’s example 
risk losing their lives, a cost that is surely greater than unemployment - however, it is clear 
that this struggle has moved beyond the economic and into the social and ethical realms. And 
in Hardy’s example of the French Resistance, actors risk not only their own death if they are 
discovered to be part of the Maquis but also family and communities members. Courpasson 
and Hardy’s examples of death are extreme cases since not all types of organizational 
resistance entail such costs. But they do surface the ideal-type structure that many forms of 
resistance approximate.     
What I really appreciate about Courpasson and Hardy’s analyses of resistance is the obvious 
departure from post-modern tendencies that marred the research agenda in the past. 
Scholarship gravitated toward water-downed Foucauldian themes that celebrated ‘micro-
emancipation’, the discursive construction of interests and the relativization of the rationales 
behind resistance. As a result, any scholarly consideration of the high stakes animating 
resistance was considered ‘grandiose’ and ontologically essentialist. Researchers gravitated 
towards more mundane and quotidian expressions of resistance since they did not risk 
implying the presence of untenable ‘grand narratives’ or ‘utopian’ ideals. Secret subjective 
attitudes like cynicism and irony were now deemed highly subversive. Failing to adjust one’s 
necktie deeply recalcitrant. Even silent farting was classified as a political act.  
Given the high stakes that Courpasson and Hardy describe, this post-modern trend now looks 
rather trite and conservative, perhaps only reflective of the kinds of resistance that academics 
were willing to engage in and thus naturally imputing it with over-the-top importance. In 
light of the regressive economic, political and environmental ‘catastrophe’ facing the 99% in 
many Western economies today, researchers are thankfully taking stock of the formidable 
scale informing the stakes and costs for those who resist. In this sense, the time in which 
subjective ‘micro-emancipation’ might have mattered is long over given the stark socio-
economic inequalities, impending environmental disaster and the abrogation of democracy 
we see many organizations perpetuating today.   
However, there was one post-modern insight that undoubtedly remains useful; the insistence 
that both resistance and power are mediated through social discourses in a highly 
indeterminant manner. Conceptualizations of resistance have in the past often relied upon 
what we might call a threshold analytics of social struggle. Power dominates the weak. But 
there is a sort of inbuilt threshold that when crossed causes the disempowered to finally snap 
and revolt. The study of resistance would be rather straight forward if it functioned in such a 
predictable and formulaic manner. We often see very little opposition in situations so 
oppressive that straight our revolt would be expected. For example, most people in Nazi 
occupied France did not resist and wilfully collaborated. On the other hand, resistance can 
occur in some of the most unexpected moments. For instance, historians have long noted that 
major social revolutions hardy ever transpire when the oppressed reach rock bottom. It is 
generally when socio-economic conditions begin to improve, ironically, that revolt is 
triggered. Both Courpasson and Hardy demonstrate how social mediation, exchange and 
discursive fomentation are crucial in its development. In other words, there is nothing 
inherent in a social situation that will automatically prompt resistance.       
As Courpasson notes, some suggest that the concept of resistance (especially as developed in 
Critical Management Studies) is often handicapped by overly romanticizing the phenomenon. 
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This leads to a reading of the power/resistance dynamic that is normatively black and white. 
Consequently the workplace is seen to be populated by the good guys (or the weak) and the 
bad guys (the powerful). We can perhaps observe this in the way the French Resistance is 
retroactively inscribed with almost mythological levels of bravery defining the courage of the 
French nation itself. Of course, the truth was a little less romantic since only tiny fraction of 
the population joined the movement. And even among the collaborationists, the logic was 
complex and contradictory, fused with sentiments of dissent, regret and survival, as depicted 
in Némirovsky’s beautiful novel Suite française.  
 
Some argue that resistance research risks imposing a rigid and predetermined analytical 
narrative - workers are good, managers are bad - onto a messy reality. I agree. But I think it is 
possible to avoid this romanticization, not by emptying our analysis of morality which would 
be a mistake, but to once again discern the costs and potential losses staked upon an act of 
political refusal. The employees in Courpasson’s discussion have much more to lose than the 
corporate executives who fired them. This also helps us deal with a related problem raised by 
Courpasson. Not only low-level workers resist. Actors in more privileged positions might as 
well, including CEOs, a point missed when the phenomenon is romanticized. This 
inevitability raises problems around the distinction between power and resistance itself. Is 
Bill Gates’ attempt to thwart the US government’s move to dismantle his monopoly 
resistance or power? If we are to retain the concept of resistance at all, it is crucial to address 
this issue. Here I follow David Collinson’s (1994: 61) argument when he states, “particular 
practices are invariably located in specific conditions of power asymmetries and inequalities 
which in turn largely determine whether they are best seen as an exercise of power or 
resistance”. Gayatri Spivak (1996: 36) makes a similar claim when discussing ‘victims of the 
system’: “the most powerful technocrat is in that sense also a victim, although in brute 
suffering his victim-hood cannot be compared to that of the poor and oppressed classes of the 
world”. 
 
The one inescapable weakness with the concept of resistance, for me at least, is the way it 
invariably posits emancipatory movements in a secondary relation to power, as a reaction to a 
primary first mover. That is to say, resistance appears to always follow the rules of the game 
laid down by dominant players whereas the dominated challenge those rules in a variety of 
ways. This sequencing is not so surprising given the natural science metaphor the term 
resistance draws upon. In Newtonian physics, every primary action has an equal and opposite 
reaction. What troubles me with the metaphor is the emergence of protest movements that are 
not reacting to power in a secondary form but departing the game altogether to enjoy its own 
positivity, creating new social worlds that are more just. In the case of the digital commons, 
for example, post-capitalist social movements have simply vacated the socio-economic 
paradigm of intellectual property, copyright and other impediments to innovation. They do 
not want to be included in the business world in any format and thus do not really resist it in a 
direct sense. In this case it is the corporation who is resisting as it seeks to recapture the 
social technologies that have superseded the capitalist institutional imperative.  
 
The ‘Post-Recognition’ Turn in Worker Resistance  
The above point concerning exit and autonomy brings me to a distinction I want to make 
between recognition and post-recognition politics in and around the contemporary workplace. 
Both types of struggle have been definitive facets of resistance for many years, but I argue 
that post-recognition politics is becoming increasingly popular for reasons I shall explain. 
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Indeed, given the discussion so far, we have a clearer idea of why people resist. Now I want 
to turn to how that resistance is articulated and practiced.  
We might differentiate recognition and post-recognition politics (or resistance) in the 
following manner. The former involves acts that seek to be seen and included in an 
organizational power forum in order to garner a better deal. Resistors strive to be recognized 
as a legitimate voice so that certain grievances, propositions and claims can be made. What I 
term post-recognition politics functions in a different manner. Here actors are skeptical about 
participating in dialogue with those whom they resist, since it often turns out to be merely a 
ruse for identifying ‘trouble makers’ and silencing collective grievances, especially by-way 
of ‘consultation’. Therefore, emancipatory objectives might be achieved by collectivity going 
it alone. Preplanned exclusion. When groups have decided that nothing constructive can be 
gained from continuing to play a game defined by distant elites, then exit and non-negotiation 
become attractive forms of refusal, be it in relation to work (Fleming, 2014), personal debt 
(Ross, 2014), the neoliberal marketplace (Perelman, 2002; Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and 
Tsianos, 2008) or male domination (Jones, 2012). This has nothing to do with individualist 
isolation, reserved silence or social withdrawal. On the contrary. As the Greta Garbo 
perfectly put it: “I never said, ‘I want to be alone.’ I only said, ‘I want to be left alone.’ There 
is all the difference.”  
 
The struggle for recognition has been a key philosophical facet of modernity and liberal 
democracy. According to Honneth (1996), the moral basis of social conflict in pluralistic 
democratic settings is premised on not only being heard (‘voice’) but also being recognized 
as a legitimate citizen with certain rights and obligations. Such demands for recognition have 
also been crucial in struggles for workplace democracy and equality. Indeed, deliberative 
dialogue was foundational in the post-War Fordist compact between labor and capital. 
Courpasson’s analysis of the retrenched insurance salespeople provides a nice example of 
recognition politics in action. The blog and the subsequent hunger strike forced the company 
to address the accusations concerning their treatment of these ex-employees. In the case, we 
see three steps unfolding. First, a justice claim is rendered visible: “this radical resistance is a 
performance that is meant to be showed and made public, as to tip the balance of power” 
(Courpasson, 2014: 3). Secondly, visibility implies a certain voice. And third, that voice 
demands recognition and recompense, not only in terms of content – what is said – but also 
its form or who is saying it.  
 
What I have labelled post-recognition politics utilizes an alternative strategy. It begins with 
the tenet that neoliberal societies have seriously eroded the Fordist compact between labour 
and capital and have developed rather parasitical tendencies. Hence the perception that 
organizations take much more than they give back. The economic, political and ethical 
motivators of resistance have accumulated to such an extent that it appears irrational to desire 
inclusion in a game designed to penalize you. This type of refusal views dialogue in 
particular as a weapon of the dominant order, leading some to call life in the post-Fordist 
workplace the ‘nightmare of participation’ (Kolowratnik, and Miessen, 2012). Post-
recognition politics opposes power by attempting to fully or partially depart its hold and 
deploy social autonomy towards more progressive and democratic ends. Overall, the point is 
not to be recognized in the mirror game of domination – that is to say, identified and held to 
account on unwinnable terms – but instead socially disappear, developing emancipatory 
projects for their own sake rather than react to the edicts of power in the hope that it might 
finally include you.  
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I suggest that this desire for exit is very redolent in neoliberal societies in crisis, especially 
symptomatic in the way many citizens have given up on formal processes of deliberative and 
dialogical representation. For example, in the U.K the radical social commentator and 
comedian Russell Brand (2014) recommends young people not to vote. His rationale being 
that parliamentary democracy has been so fully co-opted by a concentrated hegemonic elite 
that voting is more than pointless - it also feeds the myth that real democracy exists (also see 
Wolff, 2012). Brand suggests it is better to detach ourselves from a moribund political 
infrastructure and build our own democratic projects. This discernment concerning the 
irredeemable cultural ruin of late capitalist societies is captured perfectly in Cremin’s (2015) 
book Totalled, a phrase used in some parts of the world to describe damage to an automobile 
so severe that it is worthy only of abandonment. But as Cremin argues, in the realm of social 
struggle this sensibility should not lead to pessimistic nihilism or resignation, but a poignant 
change in the nature of oppositional activity.     
 
I suggest there are ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions of post-recognition politics. The strong 
version, associated with Italian Autonomists (see Hardt and Negri, 1999, 2009) and separatist 
groups such as the black liberation movement in the US (see Moten, F., and S. Harney. 
2012), calls for complete self-determination and social independence since there is nothing 
left to lose. We can see this in arguments made by the Canadian work-refusal movement the 
Institute for Experimental Freedom (2009: 156) when they aver, “one does not tidy up in a 
home falling off a cliff”. This might also explain the recent rise in ‘how to quit your job’ 
advice columns (see Altucher, 2013) and books that describe people ‘escaping’ (Escape the 
City. 2012), ‘opting out’ (Jones, 2012), ‘down-shifting’ (Nelson, Paek and Rademacher, 
2007) and so-forth vis-à-vis a life paid employment.  
The weak version of post-recognition politics does not go so far as to completely depart the 
stage of power but seeks invisibility or anonymity in order to be left alone and avoid the 
worst excesses of participation. This invisibility may be ongoing, as explored by Fleming and 
Sewell (2002) in relation to organizational Svejks or an episodic strategy to buy time and 
exact a blow to domination at the right moment. The strategies used here are similar to those 
deployed by the French Resistance mentioned by Hardy. The Maquis could not simply depart 
their occupied homeland. Thus the resistors had to blend into the crowd, become 
imperceptible so that their acts of sabotage could be as precise and effective as possible. The 
modern workplace, of course, is not as hostile a terrain. However, labor activists have 
recently suggested that anonymity might be utilized in situations in which both participation 
and non-participation are untenable. As the French anti-work network The Invisible 
Committee (2009) argue: 
Turn anonymity into a defensive position. In a demonstration, a union member 
tears the mask off an anonymous person who has just broken a window. “Take 
responsibility for what you’re doing instead of hiding yourself.” But to be 
visible is to be exposed, that is to say above all, vulnerable. When Leftists 
everywhere continually make their cause more “visible”—whether that of the 
homeless, of women or of undocumented immigrants—in hopes that it will get 
dealt with, they’re doing exactly the contrary of what must be done. Not 
making ourselves visible, but instead turning the anonymity to which we’ve 
been relegated to our advantage, and through conspiracy, nocturnal or faceless 




A good example of this method of resistance is demonstrated by whistleblower Carmen 
Segarra, a regulator employed by US Federal Reserve Bank of New York (see ‘This 
American Life’, 2014). In her role as Fed regulator Segarra began to notice major 
discrepancies concerning the close relationship between the organization and Goldman 
Sachs. The famous investment bank has a reputation for being very powerful, very male and 
very aggressive. Following the global financial crisis Rolling Stone Magazine colorfully 
described Goldman Sachs as “a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, 
relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money”. The Fed was 
supposed to be an objective auditor. However, the level of collusion and exchange with 
Goldman Sachs deeply troubled Segarra. She had no choice but to resist for ethical reasons. 
But first Segarra began to hone her skills of camouflage and imperceptibility. She recalls her 
reaction when the boss announced her new assignment: 
 
He said, do you know where you’re going? And I said, no. And he said, you’re going 
to Goldman. And my thought was, uh oh … The look on his face was like he was very 
much looking for my reaction. And when I … I think after so many years of 
practicing law, when you see someone that is just looking to see what your reaction is 
going to be, my first instinct is let me make sure that I don’t give a reaction (‘This 
American Life’, 2014). 
According to Segarra, the collusive relationship between the Fed and Goldman Sachs derived 
from a climate of fear among governmental officials. It meant that large investment banks 
could count on regulators turning a blind eye when required. This is when Segarra began to 
carry a hidden voice recorder, secretly taping 48-hours of conversation revealing the true 
relationship between the Fed watchdog and Goldman Sachs. As she recorded, Segarra was 
mostly invisible, a wallpaper-like character that looked like everybody else. But she finally 
spoke out when a superior asked her to alter a report about Goldman Sachs so it omitted a 
damaging fact. Her defiance was no doubt licensed by the clandestine voice recorder. 
Coming out of the woodwork at the crucial moment, and knowing full-well that she would 
probably be fired, Segarra does the unspeakable. She defies her superior as this transcript 
from the secret recording reveals:  
 
Johnathan Kim: I’m never questioning about the knowledge base, or the 
assessments, or those things, right? It’s really about how you are perceived. And so if 
there’s a more of a general sort of feedback that says, OK, it’s not only one person, 
it’s not only two persons, but it’s many more people who are perceiving that you have 
more sharper elbows or that you’re sort of breaking eggs. And obviously, I don’t 
know what the right word is … I think the message has come back to me saying that 
you really need to make these changes quickly in order for you to be … 
Carmen Segarra: Not fired? 
Johnathon Kim: … successful as part of the team. 
Carmen Segarra: Not fired, basically. 
Johnathon Kim: Well, I don’t even want to get there, because … and here’s why. 
Carmen Segarra: Well, I think that it would be unfair to fire me when I am, at the 
end of the day, doing a good job. 
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Johnathon Kim: Well, there’s … look. I’m here to change sort of the definition of 
what a good job is, right? Couple of things that could … 
Carmen Segarra: I can see it a mile away. 
Johnathon Kim: OK. Couple of things that I would suggest … have a sense of 
humility, because a lot of the things that you say … and this is the way you’re coming 
across, right? I think I know you well enough that that’s not what you’re saying, but if 
I were to be a new person, I would say, Carmen, you’re very arrogant (‘This 
American Life’, 2014). 
 If Segarra was practicing recognition politics she would have openly voiced her 
concerns from the outset, hoping to discuss the issue in a constructive, consensual and 
egalitarian forum (something like Habermas’ (1971/2001) famous ‘ideal speech situation’ in 
which the best argument wins). However, Segarra correctly understood that to be an 
impossible scenario. Instead, she needed to act normally and avoid being recognized as a 
resistor until the last moment. With the help of her clandestine recorder, Sagarra illustrates 
some trademark components of post-recognition politics, utilizing her longstanding status as 
a nameless office-drone to undermine the trajectory of domination in this male-dominated 
space. First, she uses the language of power against itself by redirecting its insinuations back 
at her boss. Kim vaguely admits to things that he could not openly state in an ‘ideal speech 
situation’. And secondly, knowing full well that she was going to be fired, Sagarra made sure 
she had a record of the real reason. Not only does she go public with her story, forcing the 
Fed to overhaul its procedures and protocols, Sagarra will probably receive a litigation 
payment for unfair dismissal.     
 In summary, both Courpasson and Hardy point to two kinds of resistance that shed 
light on its structure, motivations and outcomes in contemporary workplaces. I have hoped to 
introduce the concept of post-recognition politics to advance our understanding of resistance 
in the current era of economic crisis and the search for alternative organizational forms. 
Above all, I think it is important to not analytically reify resistance as an isolatable thing. 
Rather, we ought to view it as symptomatic of struggles over questions of self-determination, 
social justice and what a good life might mean. The real question is whether these political 
objectives can be achieved within the current structure of work and organizations or if some 
sort of radical departure is required. I believe that question will be important for how we 
study resistance in the future.          
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